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Why Marxist Organization Studies? Why Now?
We live in a time of crises, marked by financial collapses and extended recessions, rising economic 
insecurity and inequality, escalating ecological imbalances, and uncontrollable mutations in eco-
nomic and political relations at both the local and the global level. Such conditions challenge social 
scientists to shift their focus away from their internal academic debates and towards the burning 
issues of the day. In doing so, scholars have made two discoveries. First, in such times of crisis, 
many previously taken-for-granted features of society are put into question. In particular, the effi-
ciency of markets is challenged and capitalism no longer appears as the inevitable “end of history.” 
Second, most of our pressing societal problems now appear to cut across the boundaries of the vari-
ous social science disciplines that have been constructed over the past century or so.
These discoveries point to two new imperatives for the social sciences in general and for organi-
zation studies in particular. First, we need greater historical depth in our scholarship so as to under-
stand better the genesis of contemporary events and to differentiate more confidently between those 
events that portend radical changes and those that reflect mere adaptation. Of course, individual 
historical case studies and attention to the temporal dimension have been frequent features of organ-
izational research; but we share the view of Rowlinson and colleagues (2014, p. 258) who recently 
observed: “Saying that time matters is not the same as saying history matters.” Unless we grasp how 
the phenomena we observe today are shaped by long-term historical trends, and how events today 
may inflect those trends, we risk misinterpreting the processes currently unfolding.[AQ: 3]
Second, we need to renew the original interdisciplinary mandate of organization studies. If we 
want to understand the variety of forces—economic, political, institutional, cultural, psychological—
that (re)shape social organization and human action, we need to revitalize ties with the disciplines that 
focus on those various forces. Organization studies itself was constituted as an interdisciplinary 
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venture, combining sociology, psychology, economics, politics, and a dose of anthropology. However, 
recent decades have witnessed a retreat of organization studies from the wider engagement with these 
constituent disciplines. Publications in organization studies journals reference papers from contigu-
ous disciplines ever less frequently (Augier, March, & Sullivan, 2005; Adler, 2009a). But the press of 
external events has prompted renewed calls for interdisciplinarity, arguing that complex societal 
problems are best addressed by integrating the results of multiple methods and approaches (Biagioli, 
2009; Brewer, 2013; Delbridge, 2014; Jessop & Sum, 2001; Sayer, 2001). Such interdisciplinary 
efforts in turn demand new theoretical resources for achieving coherent integration rather than mere 
agglomeration.
Faced with these imperatives, we believe marxism can play a critical role in ensuring a vibrant 
future for organization studies. First, marxism offers insight into both the broad sweep of human 
history and the dynamics of capitalist development. Second, marxism offers a powerful interdisci-
plinary approach, unpacking the social core of economic relations and thereby helping to super-
sede the Parsonian pact (Stark, 2000; Vidal & Peck, 2012) that purchased space for sociology at the 
cost of a sharp boundary separating it from economics. In contrast to the mainstream focus on 
middle-range theory, marxism provides a grand theory, one that offers a robust platform for com-
bining historical depth and interdisciplinary breadth. This Special Forum was therefore motivated 
by our sense that organization studies’ efforts to address the challenges of our times will be consid-
erably enhanced if its middle-range theories systematically engage marxist grand theory.
In this Introduction, we briefly elaborate on the idea of and need for grand theory in organization 
studies as a crucial resource for fruitful historical interdisciplinarity, and we propose that marxism 
is a particularly useful grand theory in our efforts to contextualize, develop, and integrate diverse 
strands of middle-range organization studies. Second, we present the core ideas of marxism, includ-
ing its theory of history and its theory of capitalism, as a distinctive mode of production. There are, 
of course, numerous readings of Marx and many schools of marxism, from structural (Althusser, 
2001) to humanist (Lukacs, 1971), determinist (Cohen, 1978) to autonomist (Negri, 1989), econo-
mistic (Kliman, 2012) to political (Brenner, 1976; Wood, 2003). Here we leave aside the differences 
among these to focus on what we see as the core assumptions and propositions of marxism.
In our presentation of marxism, we interweave summaries of the four articles in this Special 
Forum, using them to illustrate some key marxist concepts. These articles demonstrate the value of 
marxist ideas across a range of traditional and emerging topics in organization studies, including 
organizational learning and communities of practice (Ingvaldsen), knowledge work, teamwork, 
and collaboration (Adler), social media and valorization (Böhm, Beverungen, & Land) and organi-
zational change, routines and path dependence (Maielli).
We also use the case of the 2007-8 financial crisis to illustrate our argument. The 2007-8 finan-
cial crisis, which began in the US and spread around the globe to Western and Eastern Europe, 
Asia, Latin America and parts of Africa (Guillén & Suárez, 2010), is a prime example of the type 
of societal problem that calls out for historical and interdisciplinary analysis. We show how organ-
ization-theoretic analyses of the crisis—such as those by Fligstein and Goldstein (2010), Guillén 
and Suárez (2010), and Pozner, Stimmler and Hirsch (2010)—can be deepened and extended with 
marxist grand theory.
The Need for Grand Theory
If the urgency of current societal problems is driving us towards more historical and interdiscipli-
nary scholarship, we submit that such scholarship will in turn require the reaffirmation of grand 
theories so as to lend coherence to our research. Grand theories, properly constituted, are essential 
to the vitality of historical and interdisciplinary ventures because they provide a coherent set of 
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problematics, categories, and concepts with which to forge links across the various middle-range 
theories and the various disciplines.
Merton (1968, p. 5) defined middle-range theories as those that are “intermediate to the minor 
working hypotheses evolved in abundance during the day-by-day routine of research, and the all-
inclusive speculations comprising a master conceptual scheme.” Boudon (1991, p. 519, emphasis in 
original) defended Merton’s rejection of grand theory as “hopeless and quixotic [attempts] to deter-
mine the essential feature of all social structure” or discover a basic set of concepts “that would be 
sufficient to analyze all social phenomena.” While it is easy to agree with the rejection of theories 
consisting of “all-inclusive speculations” and which purport to be “sufficient to analyze all social 
phenomena,” we propose that grand theory can be properly constructed to avoid these sins and 
legitimately operate as a master research program, one that is progressive in the sense defined by 
Lakatos (1980).
Our view is that grand theory and middle-range theories are complementary rather than mutu-
ally exclusive. By grand theory, we mean a unified theory that provides an analytical and narrative 
framework for systematically developing and connecting a set of middle-range theories. Building 
on Lakatos (1980), grand theory is progressive and legitimate when developed through the elabo-
ration of middle-range theories that solve empirical puzzles while systematically defending and 
revising core assumptions and propositions in a way that expands and enriches the overarching 
theory, rather than restricting that theory via ad hoc stipulations. Progressive grand theories have 
the potential to inform and integrate both inductive and deductive positions.
Our endorsement of grand theory runs counter to the postmodern skepticism articulated by 
Lyotard (1984) and others who attribute many of the horrors of the twentieth century to popular 
and elite enthusiasm for grand theory “metanarratives” in general, and for marxism in particular, 
tarred by association with the gulag. Postmodernists thus urge instead a focus on local, emic per-
spectives, which are said to be multiple and typically incommensurable.
Marxists have responded to this skepticism in two ways. Callinicos (1991) observed that post-
modern skepticism is itself a metanarrative and has therefore no greater claim on validity than the 
position it criticizes. More substantively, Harvey (1990, pp. 44, 111, 339) demonstrated that marxist 
theory not only recognizes the multiplicity of local perspectives but offers a compelling explanation 
of them. The appearance and experience of fragmentation, ephemerality and discontinuity—which 
postmodernism sees as constitutive of social (dis)order—are themselves better understood as the 
outcome of rounds of space-time compression generated by capitalist globalization. Marxism thus 
allows us to establish some critical perspective on the postmodern condition, rather than merely 
internalizing its debilitating skepticism (see also Jameson, 1984).
History, Modes of Production, Technology, and Class
Marxism begins with production, because people must produce in order to live and because pro-
ductive activity is inherently collective (Marx & Engels, [1846] 1996). Marx’s theory of the longue 
durée in history (known as historical materialism) asserts that at this time scale, change is driven 
by two structural contradictions—one between the forces and relations of production and the other 
between the basic social classes.
The forces of production consist of the means of production (physical technology and raw materi-
als), organizational technique, and human skill. The relations of production are the relations of own-
ership and control over the means of production, which define a set of basic social classes: a small 
class of property-owning elite, who appropriate surplus labor from a large class of propertyless direct 
producers. As we discuss below, in marxist theory classes are objective structures, and they interact 
in complex ways with non-class structures such as gender and race to produce subjective identities.
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Modes of production
Marx’s key concept in this longue durée is the mode of production, defined as the historically spe-
cific combination of forces and relations of production. History has seen a succession of four basic 
modes of production—primitive communism, slavery, feudalism, and capitalism—and the analy-
sis of the internal dynamics of capitalism suggest that a fifth is possible in the future—commu-
nism. This succession is characterized by the cumulative development of the forces of production 
and by corresponding changes in relations of production and class structure: from the absence of 
class divisions in primitive society to structures of slave-master, serf-lord, worker-capitalist, and 
potentially beyond class divisions again under communism. Against caricatures suggesting an 
oversimplified theory of unilinear evolution, Marx was acutely aware of “variation and of stag-
gered chronology” in the actual path of historical development (Martin, 1976, p. 268; see also 
Wickham, 2007).
At this level of abstraction, the core developmental process in history consists of the dynamic 
contradiction between the forces and relations of production. The productive forces have a ten-
dency to develop over time in the direction of higher productivity. That is because, on the one hand, 
human beings have an incentive to adopt labor-saving innovations, and on the other, no social class 
has a sustained interest in seeing productivity regress (Callinicos, 2009b; Cohen, 1978). The class 
structure of each mode of production at first serves to promote the growth of the productive forces, 
as each dominant class develops productive capacity in order to extract ever-greater surplus from 
the producing class. Yet, the cumulative development of the forces of production eventually ren-
ders obsolete the existing relations of production. Attempts by the dominant classes to maintain the 
status quo increasingly fetter the effective use and further development of the productive forces, 
and this provokes intensified class conflict and delegitimizes the dominant class.
Illustration: Community and innovation. In his article in this Special Forum, Paul Adler’s paper finds 
inspiration in this vast historical panorama to interpret changes under way today in the forms of 
community operative within firms. He notes that the theme of community has become increasingly 
prevalent in organization studies and in practitioner-oriented management literature through con-
cepts such as informal organization, organizational trust, organic organizational form, organiza-
tional culture, social networks, social capital, clans, supplier partnerships, industrial districts, 
communities of practice, and open source communities. In this literature, community seems to be 
an essential, indeed increasingly important, precondition for innovation. He highlights the result-
ing paradox: the idea of community itself—insofar as it has any determinate content—almost 
invariably harkens back to Tönnies’ concept of pre-capitalist traditionalistic Gemeinschaft (com-
munity as such) and its contrast with capitalist Gesellschaft (modern, voluntary association), but 
Gemeinschaft’s traditionalism makes it unsuited to innovation tasks.
The resolution of this paradox, Adler argues, lies in acknowledging that at the current level of 
development of the productive forces innovation requires a qualitatively different and historically 
novel form of community. Arguing theoretically and illustrating his points with case data from 
field research on a software services company, Adler argues that capitalist rationalization has 
largely destroyed pre-capitalist community in the labor process, but in parallel has led to the emer-
gence of this radically new type of community. He sees this new type emerging through a dialecti-
cal synthesis of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft—creating a type that he calls Genossenschaft, or 
collaborative. Marxism sees organizational technique and form as part of the forces of production, 
and Adler concludes, consistent with Marx’s argument that any historical new mode of production 
emerges in the womb of the old, that collaborative community is a socio-technical transformation 
representing communism’s emergence in the heart of capitalism.
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Base/superstructure and soft determinism
The forces and relations of production together constitute the economic base of society, and on 
this base sits society’s political/ideological superstructure. Marxism’s account of both the rela-
tionship between forces and relations of production and the relationship between base and 
superstructure have been taken to imply indefensible determinism: in the first instance, techno-
logical determinism of the forces over the relations of production and, in the second, economic 
determinism of the base over the superstructure. That line of criticism again relies on a carica-
ture. In neither case does the marxist account imply a mechanical determinism. Wright (1978) 
has explicated Marx’s argument here as referring to a process of “structural limitation,” in 
which the determining factors set limits on the range of forms that the determined factors 
can take.
This soft, structural-limitation form of determinism does not exclude reciprocal effects of the 
superstructure on the base, but posits that the overall path of history will be marked by asymmetry 
in this two-way causal interaction (Engels, 2010). In the assessment of Cambridge historian W. G. 
Runciman (2007, p. 7), Marx’s grand-theoretic proposition—that “the strongest evolutionary force 
driving human history is economic rather than ideological or political and that classes … are its 
agents” —continues to animate a great deal of fruitful historical research.
Illustration: Material bases of institutional logics implicated in the 2007-8 financial crisis. The base/
superstructure model allows us to enrich our field’s research on the role played by culture and 
institutional logics in the 2007-8 financial crisis. Fligstein and Goldstein (2010, p. 29) suggest 
that the “rational actor/financial model formed the dominant cultural-institutional infrastruc-
ture” in which government regulators “were embedded.” Pozner et al. (2010, p. 189) add that the 
core assumptions of this ideology, including the assumption that new financial models were able 
to correctly price risk, were reinforced because the key actors constituted a dense network which 
worked to suppress disconfirming information and encourage herd-like behavior. Pozner et al. 
document a shift within the mortgage industry, under the hegemony of efficient market theory, 
from a “Main Street logic” in which mortgages were seen as “consumer loans geared at support-
ing the institution of homeownership,” to a “Wall Street logic” in which mortgages were seen as 
investment instruments. Both studies, however, leave open the question of why efficient market 
theory was embraced by regulators in the late 1970s and the Wall Street logic by the industry in 
the late 1980s.
Marxism reminds us that hegemonic ideologies rise and fall along with material transforma-
tions in the economy. From the late 19th century to World War I, international financial markets 
thrived. While private and central bankers, led by London and New York, controlled the levers 
of financial power and successfully promoted laissez-faire ideology throughout the 1920s, after 
the Great Depression the bankers were discredited and a coalition of industrialists, labor lead-
ers, and state officials adopted a protectionist and Keynesian ideology, which was hegemonic 
through the 1930s to the crisis of Fordism in the 1970s (Helleiner, 1994). Although bankers and 
others never flagged in their advocacy of the ideology of financial liberalization, it was only 
after a decade of stagnation in the 1970s that it began to achieve widespread acceptance. In 
response to the pressures emanating from the economic base—a stagnant real economy with an 
oversupply of physical capital (Foster & Magdoff, 2009; Vidal, 2013)—and reflecting the 
material conditions of the postfordist accumulation regime, neoliberal ideology included a 
range of new financial institutional logics such as the efficient market hypothesis, the share-
holder value approach to corporate governance, and the Wall Street approach to mortgage 
lending.
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Structure and agency
The marxist thesis of a soft determinism in these causal interactions—of forces with relations of 
production, and of base with superstructure—is further nuanced in marxist theory, since it allows 
that the relative causal roles of structural factors and human agency varies depending on the level 
of aggregation. Schematically, we can differentiate three such levels.
Across the highest level, in the broad sweep of history, the productive forces exert powerful 
structural limitations on the relations of production. Capitalist relations of production were impos-
sible with the low levels of surplus produced by the slave mode or the early centuries of the feudal 
mode; the democratic state was impossible under feudalism. Individual and collective agency will 
explain little at this level of aggregation.
At a less aggregated level of analysis, such as the comparative analysis of national production 
regimes, employment systems, or state policies within a given period, considerable causal weight 
must be given to political and ideological factors and to the collective agency of social actors 
(Delbridge, Hauptmeier & Sengupta, 2011; Smith & Meiksins, 1995). It is here, at this level of 
analysis, that Gramsci’s ([1929-1935] 1999) theory of hegemony is fruitful in its balancing of 
structural determinism and human agency (Delbridge, 2007; Levy & Egan, 2003)[AQ: 4]. For 
Gramsci, hegemony operates at both the ideological level, in the form of a compelling narrative in 
which the interests of the dominant group are presented as the interests of all, and at the material 
level, in the form of the “concrete coordination of interests” between dominant and subordinate 
groups (e.g., the democratic vote, high wages). In this analysis “moral and political leadership” 
play a fundamental role in the development of ideology. Ideologies are particularly likely to “grip 
the masses” when based in some form of material (class) compromise, but once an ideology has 
become hegemonic—widely accepted—it becomes material force in its own right.
At the most disaggregated level, such as the use of a given technology in a given enterprise at a 
given point in time, individual and collective agency may well appear dominant (Adler & Borys, 
1989). The implementation of technology in local contexts—like the design of technologies them-
selves—is to a very large extent shaped by local social conditions and the choices of local actors 
(MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1999). However, it is a fallacy of composition to conclude from this that 
technology’s intrinsic developmental potentialities do not have an asymmetrically powerful effect on 
the developmental trajectory of social structure over the long term and over larger social aggregates.
Illustration: Structural hegemony and organizational lock-in at Fiat. In his article in this Special Forum, 
Giuliano Maielli shows the value of integrating the more structural and more agentic dimensions of 
hegemony. He applies a neo-Gramscian interpretation of the agency-structure interplay and distin-
guishes between “structural hegemony” and “hegemonic projects.” These concepts are comple-
mented with a critical realist analysis of institutional complexity (Delbridge & Edwards, 2013). 
Agency is thus conceived as embedded within, but distinct from, different institutional logics which 
shape action. Hegemonic projects are undertaken by a specific group of actors within a particular set 
of relationships while structural hegemony is informed by the underpinning structural, institutional, 
and historical context. The paper analyses the forces that prevented Fiat from increasing its output-
mix flexibility after 1970 in spite of expected and actual changes in the structure of demand. Maielli 
interprets Fiat’s inability to achieve a better fit with the changing market as a case of organizational 
lock-in, and explains this lock-in as the result of a combination of structural hegemony and the 
hegemonic projects of specific actors. Senior management at Fiat was aware of forthcoming changes 
in the market and took steps towards changing the business model and acquiring new competences 
to improve its capacity to meet market demands for higher quality vehicles; that is, they engaged in 
various hegemonic projects. But they failed to develop the dynamic capabilities needed to trigger 
the self-reinforcing mechanisms (increasing returns and economies of scale) required to break out 
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of the old meta-routines and thus impact significantly on the wider structural hegemony. Self-rein-
forcing processes (both political and cognitive) led to the confirmation of old meta-routines for 
design selection (reflecting the internal propensity to prioritize manufacturability over innovation), 
hence preventing the emergence of new meta-routines needed to drive the product mix towards 
higher-price segments or greater product-mix flexibility.
The Capitalist Mode of Production
Capitalism is a distinctive mode of production that emerges when the forces of production reach a 
level of sophistication where they can only be deployed effectively under a complex division of 
labor based on a market for wage labor. The corresponding relations of production are character-
ized by: private ownership of the means of production by the capitalist class; goods and services 
are exchanged as commodities in markets producing profits for capitalist enterprises; profits stem 
from the surplus value extracted from workers who sell their labor-power to capitalists in exchange 
for a wage. We explicate these below.
Commodities and their value
The first sentence of Capital, Vol. 1 (Marx, [1867] 1990) is a good place to start: in capitalist socie-
ties, Marx writes, wealth presents itself as an immense accumulation of commodities—that is, as 
products and services produced by labor for sale. The commodity has two aspects that are often in 
conflict (in a relation that Marx calls a “real contradiction”): on the one hand, it is a use value, in 
that it can satisfy a need, and on the other, an exchange value, in that it can be sold for money.
To the key question of how exchange value is determined, the marxist answer is the labor theory 
of value, which asserts that the exchange value of a product is determined by the socially necessary 
labor-time associated with that product’s creation. Supply and demand conditions explain the fluc-
tuation of prices around this center of gravity (Marx, [1867] 1990; Marx, [1894] 1981; Shaikh, 
1982). This theory stands as an extension of a long line of classical economists’ reflections on 
value, and—notwithstanding its eclipse by neoclassical theory—it has been shown in recent 
research to be an excellent predictor of market prices (Shaikh & Tonak, 1997). Despite the short-
run effects of changing supply and demand conditions, in the long run, products with less direct 
and indirect labor content will consistently cost less than products with more labor content.
The pressure on firms to reduce direct labor-time along with other production costs is a defining 
feature of capitalism. Regardless of the subjective preferences of individual capitalists and manag-
ers, competition in financial and product markets relentlessly pushes firms to reduce the labor-time 
invested in the production of their own output. To the extent that they surpass their competitors in 
this effort, they may temporarily earn super-profits. But their competitors are under pressure to 
imitate them, and when they do, this reduces the average labor-time required to produce that com-
modity and its average price will fall.
Profit
Marx’s value theory seeks to explain how profits are made from the production and sale of com-
modities, assuming that all goods exchange at their real value. The answer offered by mainstream 
economic theory is that (when markets are competitive) enterprise profits are merely the normal 
returns to the provision of a scarce resource in the form of capital equipment. At equilibrium, we 
are told, profits reflect the marginal productivity of capital. This theory, however, is logically 
untenable, even though mainstream economists continue to rely on it. When Samuelson and other 
leading proponents of this theory were challenged by marxist-inspired economists at Cambridge 
8 Organization Studies
University in the 1960s (Joan Robinson and Piero Sraffa), the former were forced to admit that 
their theory was bankrupt (Cohen & Harcourt, 2003; Samuelson, 1966). The reason is not hard to 
see: it is not possible to talk of the marginal productivity of capital unless the value of the various 
pieces of equipment that constitute that capital can be aggregated; the only way to aggregate these 
values is by using their prices; but these prices include the profits of the enterprises that produced 
that equipment; so the rate of profit cannot be deduced unless the profit rate is already known. (By 
contrast, there is little difficulty adding up hours of labor: even if they differ in skill level, that 
complication can be handled by using a complexity coefficient.)
If profits in competitive markets cannot be explained by capital’s marginal productivity, they can, 
in contrast, be explained by the power of capitalists to extract surplus labor from their employees. The 
account proceeds in two steps. First, we note that once workers are dispossessed of their land and of 
any means of supporting themselves other than by working for a wage, their laborpower appears on 
the labor market as if it were a commodity. (Polanyi’s ([1944] 1968) increasingly influential analysis 
of the role of the state in establishing the market economy clearly owes a strong debt to Marx in this 
regard.) Capitalists pay workers for the use of this laborpower on the same basis as they pay for any 
other commodity—at a wage rate that represents the socially necessary labor-time required for this 
commodity’s production. In the case of labor-power, its exchange value is therefore simply the wage 
level that corresponds to the prevailing standard of living of working-class families, augmented 
where appropriate by a factor representing the investment in further education and training.
The second step in the marxist theory of profits is based on the historical fact that workers at this 
relatively advanced level of development of the forces of production can produce the equivalent of 
their exchange value in only a fraction of the working day. Marx called this fraction “necessary 
labor-time.” Capitalists, however, have the power—through their ownership and control of socie-
ty’s means of production—to demand that workers work a full day in exchange for access to this 
wage. The threat of unemployment ensures that workers accept this deal. Profits, then, arise most 
fundamentally from the difference between the value produced in the entire working day (say, 
eight hours’ worth) and the value produced during the necessary labor-time required to pay their 
full wage (say, four hours). Marx calls this difference “surplus value.” We see here again how 
marxist theory offers an interdisciplinary perspective linking the sociology of class dispossession 
with the economics of prices and profits.
Illustration: Value, free labor and profit in the social media industry. In their article in this Special Forum, 
Böhm, Beverungen, and Land use marxist value theory creatively to present a provocative argument 
that users of social media are performing unpaid labor that accounts for the profits of social media 
companies. Their article uses the example of Facebook, which was able to make annual revenues 
over $5 billion in 2012 employing only 4,619 employees. Böhm et al.’s central argument is that the 
nearly one billion users of Facebook, even though not in a wage relation with it, generate surplus 
value, which is managed and valorized by the company. Facebook, like other social media compa-
nies, exploit their users to produce an “audience commodity”—an audience that is available to 
advertisers and that can be analysed statistically to allow advertisers to target the most profitable 
users. This argument affirms basic aspects of classical marxist value theory while challenging oth-
ers. Facebook is able to capture such free labor at a distance, so to speak, without any employment 
relation, by locking users into the platform and creating an artificial scarcity of user data.
The capitalist enterprise
Within the enterprise, the transhistorical contradiction between forces and relations of production 
that was discussed above is played out in the contradictory imperatives that shape the two aspects of 
the production process—of efficiency in the labor process that creates use value, and profitability in 
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the valorization process that creates exchange value (Marx, [1867] 1990). The labor process is the 
cooperative process of work; the valorization process is the contested extraction of surplus value 
from workers. While early labor-process theory (Braverman, 1974) proposed that deskilling and the 
degradation of work are the basic, inherent tendencies of capitalism, subsequent scholarship has 
argued that Marx’s account is better understood as explicating a dynamic contradiction between 
degradation and skill upgrading tendencies (Adler, 2007). Alongside the deskilling tendency, Marx 
saw a process he called “socialization” taking place in the form of increasingly large-scale coopera-
tion and an increasingly educated workforce.
Illustration: Productive socialization, the collective worker, and explicit knowledge. In his article in this 
Special Forum, Jonas Ingvaldsen offers a critique of the “communities of practice” literature, lev-
eraging Marx’s periodization and his concept of socialization. The concept of community of prac-
tice grew out of anthropological research on handicraft apprenticeships (Lave & Wenger, 1991) 
[AQ: 5], but it has been increasingly adopted as a general theory of organizational learning. Ing-
valdsen argues theoretically—and offers illustrations from his field research—against the extrapo-
lation of this model from handicraft to modern industry under capitalism. As the labor process is 
progressively socialized, individual work effort is subsumed into a broader “collective worker,” 
whose interdependence is managed formally through the technical division of labor and whose 
efforts are leveraged with the conscious application of science and technology. In such settings, 
learning depends far more on explicit knowledge, on formal work organization, and on learning 
processes orchestrated by managers and technologists, rather than on tacit knowledge and informal 
coordination by workers posited by communities of practice theory. This process of capitalist 
rationalization tends to erode traditional sources of craft and professional community, but it also 
enables the emergence of new types of skills—less craft and more technical and scientific—and 
new forms of organization within the collective worker.
Classes
While the basic class structure of capitalism creates a primordial split between this working class 
and the capitalist class, the class structure becomes differentiated by several factors. First, capital-
ism leaves room, although progressively less, for a “traditional” middle class of self-employed or 
small-scale and family enterprises. Second, capitalist development stimulates the emergence of 
new high-skill and professional categories and a broadening layer of middle managers, who find 
themselves in contradictory class locations (Wright, 1997).
Marxist theory does not assume that class position alone determines identities and subjective 
interests, but sees class interacting in complex ways with gender, race, nationality, and so on in 
shaping these. Consistent with the orientation to soft determination discussed above, marxism 
encourage us to consider the different causal weights of these various dimensions of differentiation 
in shaping behavior and attitudes (Gimenez, 2001) and to pay close attention to the material bases 
and economic significance of gender/race/nation ideologies. For instance, in western economies 
over the early- to mid-20th century, class and gender relations combined to produce a dominant 
labor market model of male breadwinning and female homemaking (Hartmann, 1979). As underly-
ing economic relations changed in the 20th century, gender relations and ideologies changed.
Developmental tendencies
Marxist theory identifies several key tendencies of capitalist economies, each of which can be miti-
gated by counter-tendencies. Some critics see this conceptual framing as a weakness of marxist 
theory, since the dialectical interplay of tendency and counter-tendency typically does not generate 
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determinate empirical predictions in any specific context. Marxists respond by arguing that if the 
capitalist system’s dynamics have this somewhat chaotic character, then a good theory is one that 
identifies broad patterns that render intelligible that local unpredictability. Let us review this dia-
lectical interplay in the key dimensions of capitalist development.
First, as noted above, the forces of production tend to develop over time through a process Marx 
called socialization. This socialization operates at three levels: increasingly large-scale cooperation 
within and between enterprises; an increasingly educated and technically sophisticated working 
class able to access and deploy society’s accumulated scientific and technological knowledge; and 
increasing interdependence of increasingly specialized branches of economic activity across an 
increasingly integrated global economy (Adler, 2009b; Marx, [1867] 1990, pp. 772, 1024). This 
socialization tendency is simultaneously stimulated and undermined by valorization pressures. 
Valorization, on the one hand, pushes firms to develop these new forms of cooperation, but on the 
other hand, acts as a centrifugal force when competition undermines cooperation.
Second, in relations among capitalists, market competition leads over time to its opposite—twin 
tendencies toward the concentration of capital into the hands of a small number of capitalists and 
firms, and centralization of capital in ever bigger enterprises. It is in the nature of the system that 
the big fish eat the little fish. Competition persists, however, both among the big fish and in driving 
the emergence of new entrepreneurial ventures.
Third, there is a persistent downward pressure on the rate of profit, leading to periodic crises of 
profitability. Capitalists seek to compete by lowering their costs; one of the key means of reducing 
costs is substituting machines for labor; but eliminating labor eliminates in the process opportuni-
ties for surplus labor extraction; as a result, competition tends to drive down profit rates. While 
many have been skeptical of this tendency because it derives from the labor theory of value, there 
is robust evidence of declining corporate profit rates across the OECD beginning after World War 
II (Duménil & Lévy, 2004; Glyn, Hughs, Lipietz, & Singh, 2007; Vidal, 2013), thus vindicating a 
core marxist concept. On the other hand, however, this process can be reversed if the cost of 
machines can be reduced fast enough. A second countervailing factor is the expansion of the capi-
talist system to previously non-capitalist regions and countries, opening up new sources of cheaper 
labor and new markets for firms’ products (Wallerstein, 1979).
This latter process contributes to the persistence of imperialist expansion in the capitalist world. 
Prior modes of production were also characterized by imperialistic expansion, but in those settings 
the drive was at root political and military. In contrast, under capitalism, imperialist expansion is 
driven by a convergence and entanglement of geopolitical and economic interests (Callinicos, 
2009a). The same relentless pressure for growth drives capitalist industry towards privatizing the 
various “commons” that have persisted within capitalist societies, turning the results and precondi-
tions of communal activities into private property that can be absorbed into the process of capital 
accumulation.
Fourth, these basic features of capitalism generate periodic crises of overaccumulation. Any 
system of market-based commodity production must suffer the consequences of the lack of ex ante
planning, and in a system based on competition for profitable growth, the key result is a persistent 
tendency to overaccumulation. Competition among firms—fueled by credit—drives a headlong 
rush of each firm to expand output faster than competitors. The result is predictable: periodic crises 
of overaccumulation in which capital is devalued, capacity destroyed and unemployment increased 
through bankruptcies, mergers, and acquisitions. The countervailing process is devalorization: cri-
ses lead to the destruction of value, which sets the stage for renewed profitability (since the denom-
inator of the rate of profit is reduced) and thereby prompts a new phase of accumulation. As Harvey 
(2010) has noted, such crises swept across the globe in 1848, 1929, 1973, and 2008—but we are 
still waiting for this latest one to devalue enough capital to relaunch capitalist growth.
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Fifth, the capitalist system’s growth imperative eventually bumps into the limits of the natural 
world. Marx presciently argued that capitalist agriculture created a metabolic rift between humans 
and the soil, as capitalism was unable to maintain sufficient recycling of soil nutrients (Foster, 
1999). The rift is most developed today in terms of the carbon cycle, which has been ruptured by 
the accumulation of CO2 in the atmosphere, overwhelming the capacity of natural sinks to absorb 
the additional carbon produced under capitalist production (Foster, Clark, & York, 2011). In this 
instance, it is less clear that capitalism generates its own countervailing process. As Klein (2014) 
has argued, it seems most likely that this development tendency of capitalism can only be blocked 
by a radical socialist transformation.
Illustration: Concentration, centralization and socialization underlying the 2007-8 financial crisis. Although 
not framed in marxist terms, the concentration and centralization of capital are central to the organi-
zation theoretic accounts of Guillén and Suárez (2010), Pozner et al. (2010, p. 192) and Fligstein and 
Goldstein (2010, p. 31). The latter note that by the outset of the crisis “in every facet” of the mort-
gage-backed security industry—originators, packagers, wholesalers, servicers, ratings agencies—
“five firms controlled at least 40% of the market (and in some cases closer to 90%).” Guillén and 
Suárez (2010) emphasize the rise of giant, diversified, and decentralized multinationals, both inside 
and outside of the financial sector, developing their analysis using Perrow’s (1984) theory of normal 
accidents. This theory holds that the likelihood of catastrophe is high in any system where two con-
ditions obtain: high complexity (i.e., many interdependent parts) and tight coupling (i.e., no slack or 
buffers in the system connecting the parts). Within the US financial system in the late 1990s, com-
plexity increased due to the rise of giant, diversified, decentralized, globalized financial institutions. 
This reduced the ability of observers to understand the whole system. Coupling was tightened in the 
US financial sector by use of leverage (reducing buffers against wrong bets) and over-the-counter 
securities and derivatives that were tailor-made (hence difficult to exit), increasing the likelihood 
that single mishaps would have ripple effects. Coupling was tightened globally due to the growth of 
deeply integrated, lean global supply chains (which eliminate supply buffers) so that when financial 
disruptions bled into the productive economy they rapidly spread across the global economy.
Marxist theory enriches this analysis by locating the processes of increasing complexity and 
tight coupling within the deeper contradiction between productive socialization and private owner-
ship. Although high complexity and tight coupling may increase system fragility on their own, in 
the financial crisis this potential fragility was turned into actual calamity by powerful actors oper-
ating according to the profit imperative within a system of private property. In terms of socializa-
tion, new financial instruments and tighter inter-firm linkages due to the concentration and 
centralization of capital brought new efficiencies to both the real economy and the financial mar-
kets. Yet, as Perrow (2010, p. 308) acknowledged, the collapse of the financial system was not 
spontaneous, but was driven by financial actors who actively used free market ideology “for per-
sonal and class ends with knowledge of the damage they might cause.” Perrow shows that there 
were ample warnings of increased system risk associated with deregulation, which came from 
European regulators and a range of dissenting voices from the US Senate, House, Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission, and the Federal Reserve Bank as well as from the hedge fund indus-
try and economics and sociology professions.
As regards policy remedies, the mainstream analysis based on normal accident theory suggests 
that regulators should break up the big banks so as to create a more competitive financial market. 
The marxist approach argues that instead of trying to hold back the concentration and centraliza-
tion tendencies of capital, the more effective path—one more consonant with the basic path of 
socialization in historical development—would be to take these trends to their logical conclusion 
by nationalizing the big banks and putting them under democratic control as public utilities.
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The capitalist state
In marxist theory, the state as a differentiated institutional sphere within and above society is a key 
feature of all surplus-producing modes of production (i.e., slavery, feudalism, and capitalism). 
Through its monopoly of the means of violence and its institutionalized mechanisms of control 
such as the legal system, the state is an essential mechanism for assuring the dominance of the 
dominant class. While Marx never elaborated a fully developed theory of the state, his scattered 
comments were sufficient to inspire a vibrant tradition of marxist state theory beginning with Lenin 
and running through to the present (for an overview see Jessop, 1982).
Two complementary ideas characterize the marxist theory of the capitalist state. On the one hand, 
and most fundamentally, the state in any class-divided society cannot but function as the state of the 
dominant class. In a capitalist economy, even when legislators are elected under formally demo-
cratic procedures and even when civil servants are selected and promoted meritocratically, the state 
functions as a “collective capitalist” (Offer, 1974) [AQ: 6]. Its role is to manage the health of the 
overall economy and stability of society on behalf of the capitalist class as a whole, and to defend 
those class interests both against workers’ demands and against the “special” interests of competing 
individual capitalists and fractions of capital. On the other hand, in certain situations, powerful frac-
tions of the capitalist class—based in specific industries or regions—can exert direct influence over 
the state’s decisions. Against liberal-pluralist ideology, marxist theory sees this kind of direct influ-
ence via “cooptation” and “capture” not as a corruption of the democratic state’s true nature, but as 
merely another expression of the fundamental class nature of the state in a class-divided, capitalist 
society. Sometimes specific fractions of capital are able to influence state policy because of their 
economic power, and sometimes this goes against interest of capital-in-general.
Illustration: The financial class, state deregulation, and the 2007-8 financial crisis. Pozner et al. (2010) 
argue that lack of regulation of the financial sector was not simply due to the hegemony of efficient 
market theory, but also direct cooptation of the regulatory process. Goldman Sachs illustrates: a 
revolving door between the executive suite of Goldman Sachs and the US Treasury department 
was exploited by Henry Fowler, Henry Paulson, and Robert Rubin (as well as Jon Corzine going 
to the US Senate and Stephen Friedman to the National Economic Council and the New York Fed-
eral Reserve Bank). The banking industry had so much influence over regulators that the illegal 
merger of Citibank and Traveler’s Group— a merger with clearly violated the Glass-Steagall Act’s 
prohibition of banks conducting both commercial and investment banking—was retroactively 
made legal by the repeal of Glass-Steagall, 18 months after the fact.
For marxists, the recurrence of such events is entirely predictable, rather than representing rare 
and unexpected aberrations. The domination of the state by the financial fraction of the capitalist 
class was not only a result of capture by special interests of one industry, but reflected a deeper 
mutation of capitalism itself toward a new financialized regime of accumulation. To see “capture” 
as the key mechanism here therefore misses the deeper interconnection of the state with the capital-
ist economy as a whole, and draws us back to the naïvely ideological, pluralist view of the state. 
Financial interests were able to ensure state policy was shaped in their sectional interests because 
they have become the most economically powerful fraction of capital in the postfordist era.
Stages of capitalist development
Marx saw capitalism as historically unprecedented in its dynamism and rate of growth; as a result, 
marxism devotes considerable attention to the periodization of capitalist development. The central 
insight is that just as history unfolds in successive modes of production, each of these modes, 
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including capitalism, unfolds in several stages driven by the dialectical interaction of technology, 
economic, political, and cultural factors. Such co-evolution gives rise to a development path in 
which periods of settlement and stasis are succeeded by periods of massive disruption by technical 
revolutions or endogenous crises, leading to the reconfiguration of institutions into a new (tempo-
rary) settlement.
One of the most influential marxist periodizations differentiates three main phases of capital-
ism: competitive, monopoly, and finance-dominated (see the work of the Monthly Review school 
of marxism: Baran & Sweezy, 1966; Foster & Magdoff, 2009). Another differentiates the competi-
tive, fordist, and postfordist periods (see the work of the Regulationist school: Aglietta, [1970] 
2000; Jessop, 1997; Lipietz, 1986). These historical formulations offer advantages over influential 
ahistorical typologies such as the varieties of capitalism approach, because they allow us to specify 
common growth trajectories across distinct social formations (Vidal, 2014), for example the dis-
tinction between liberal fordism, blocked fordism, and nonliberal fordism (Vidal, forthcoming 
#895, see also Lipietz, 1987; Peck & Tickell, 2000).
Illustration: The subordination of production to finance in the postfordist accumulation regime and the 
2007-8 financial crisis. In their analyses of the 2007-8 financial crisis, both Fligstein and Goldstein 
(2010, pp. 35, 50) and Pozner and colleagues (2010) focus entirely on developments within the 
mortgage securitization market leading to the growth of the subprime market. Pozner et al. empha-
size how three acts of deregulation by the US government in the 1980s cleared the way for sub-
prime mortgage lending. Fligstein and Goldstein (2010, pp. 35, 50, emphasis added) argue that 
“the demise of the savings and loan banks was a fortuitous collapse that hastened the growth of the 
MBS market.” They conclude that “the proximate cause of the crisis can be found in two shifts in 
the structure of the mortgage securitization field.” First, easy credit allowed banks and other finan-
cial institutions to borrow at low interest rates and buy high-yield mortgage-backed securities. 
Second, when the market for prime mortgages dried up in 2004, this led to predatory lending in the 
subprime market to continue driving the bubble.
These analyses suggest that the crisis was a contingent outcome of mid-term institutional 
changes: they do not attempt to push the causal chain back from the proximate to the underlying 
causes. In contrast, the marxist theory of accumulation regimes holds that the economy goes 
through regular periods of growth followed by crisis, at which point organizations and institutions 
enter a period of reconfiguration. More specifically, marxism allows us to link the proximate 
causes of the crisis to the longer-term dynamics of capitalist development, in particular as these 
dynamics remake the relation between the productive and financial sectors of the economy.
From World War II until the early 1970s, the US accumulation regime was fordist: a manufac-
turing-based economy with a class compromise realized through collective bargaining and a 
Keynesian welfare state (Aglietta, [1970] 2000), oligopolistic competition between vertically inte-
grated firms with internal labor markets (Vidal, forthcoming), and an investment-production nexus 
in which finance primarily served the productive sectors (Boyer, 2000). As this regime matured in 
the late 1960s, the fordist model exhausted its ability to generate sufficiently rapid productivity 
growth, and the economy accumulated excess productive capacity. The capital/labor ratio began to 
increase, as did the costs of maintaining the post-World-War Two class compromise, and the profit 
rate declined. In response, corporate America abandoned the class compromise and began an 
assault on labor to recover profits out of wages (Vidal, 2013). Faced with overcapacity, corporate 
America sought profits from financial circuits rather than productive activities (Krippner, 2005). A 
postfordist, financialized accumulation regime emerged, where financial ideologies dominated 
corporate governance and where production was subordinated to financial concerns (Davis, 2009; 
Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000).
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Such a marxist analysis suggests that crisis was a largely predictable outcome of a financialized 
accumulation regime in which there is a surplus of financial capital combined with overcapacity in 
the productive economy and restricted consumption power due to stagnating wages (partially off-
set by debt financing). Whereas Fligstein and Goldstein (2010, p. 46) see the move into the sub-
prime market as a response of originators to a “supply shock” due to saturation of the prime market 
and the end of easy credit, the marxist account makes saturation and easy credit endogenous. To be 
sure, Fligstein and Goldstein provide a compelling mid-range examination, but their argument 
becomes much more compelling if it is complemented by the longer-term marxist analysis.
Conclusion
We have argued that increasing attention to the critical societal problems of our times by organization 
studies—and by the social sciences more broadly—points to an urgent need for greater historical 
depth, interdisciplinarity, and a renewed emphasis on grand theory. Deeper historical analysis is nec-
essary to understand better the interrelation of structural and conjunctural sources of contemporary 
events and social problems, to connect proximate and longer-term causes, and to differentiate cycles 
from secular trends. Interdisciplinarity is required if we are to make better sense of these complex, 
interrelated dynamics. Grand theory is required to bring sufficient coherence and shared understand-
ing to such complex research undertakings. Building on Lakatos (1980), we have argued that grand 
theoretical research programs are scientifically progressive when they develop through engagement 
with middle-range theories that solve empirical puzzles while they systematically defend and revise 
core assumptions and propositions in a way that expands and enriches the overarching theory.
We have sought to demonstrate that marxist grand theory is a vibrant, progressive research pro-
gram whose core propositions have received extensive empirical corroboration and theoretical 
development. The unifying framework of a marxist theory and its core concepts offer much that 
can enrich other approaches to be found in organization theory.
We showed how the articles in this Special Forum illustrate the fruitfulness of marxist concepts, 
and we further illustrated our argument using the case of the 2007-8 financial crisis. Organization 
theorists have to date offered valuable explanations of some of the key features of this crisis. These 
analyses have emphasized now-classical tropes of organization theory: institutional isomorphism, 
network effects, institutional logics, complexity, coupling, cooptation. These analyses also reveal 
the importance of forces and processes that are central to marxist theory: the concentration and 
centralization of capital within the financial sector, subordination of production to finance in the 
postfordist accumulation regime, and financial deregulation by a state dominated by financial 
interests. Yet, mainstream organizational analysis of the crisis has remained largely limited to the 
three decades leading up to the crisis. A non-expert reading these analyses would be left with a 
distinct—and, we argue, incorrect—impression that the 2007-8 financial crisis had nothing to do 
with the structural dynamics of capitalism and everything to do with a contingent set of mid-term 
institutional, cultural, and political forces.
Organization studies will wither if we do not find the conceptual resources with which to address 
urgent societal problems of our times. As illustrated by our brief case study of the latest financial 
crisis, and in greater detail by the four articles in this Forum, marxist grand theorizing can play a 
crucial role in energizing and equipping organization studies to meet this challenge.
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